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ARTICLE
LAW AND WAR AFTER THE COLD WAR
Louis HENKIN*
When I selected the subject for this lecture, I intended to address
the impact on the law of the United Nations Charter of forty years of
cold war - of surrogate wars, of interventions and counter-interven-
tions, of Korea and Vietnam, Afghanistan and Panama. In the inter-
vening months, we lived through a "hot war" in the Persian Gulf,
which awakened different, long dormant, issues of law and war - the
law of collective self-defense and collective security, the authority of
the United Nations Security Council, and the rights, responsibilities
and obligations of members of the United Nations. Within the United
States, the Gulf crisis also stirred fundamental constitutional issues as
to the respective "war powers" of Congress and the President, constitu-
tional questions that became entangled with the international law gov-
erning the use of force and collective security.
"Law and War After the Cold War" thus now suggests additional,
larger, more complex issues. And so, I offer two - or two and a half
- mini-lectures. First, I address the substantive law on the use of force
between states, the law of the U.N. Charter. I ask: What was the law
of the Charter as framed? What have forty years of cold war done to
that law? What is likely to be the law of the future? In my second
lecture, I address the Charter system of collective security, the impact
of the Cold War on that system, and the revival of collective security in
the Gulf War. Finally, in a brief coda, I glance at war powers under
the U.S. Constitution after the Cold War and the Gulf War.
* University Professor Emeritus, Columbia University. This paper was prepared
for delivery as the annual Gerber Lecture at the University of Maryland School of
Law, March 21, 1991. I have edited and adapted it in small respects.
In this lecture, I have.drawn on my previous writings, notably How NATIONS
BEHAVE, LAW AND FOREIGN POLICY (2d ed. 1979), Chapter 7; Use of Force: Law and
U.S. Policy, in RIGHT V. MIGHT, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE (2d
ed., Council on Foreign Relations 1991); also The Invasion of Panama Under Interna-
tional Law: A Gross Violation, 29 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 293 (1991); and Con-
gress, the President and the United Nations, 3 PACE Y.B. INT'L L. 1 (1991).
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I. THE SUBSTANTIVE LAW OF THE U.N. CHARTER
In 1945, the end of the Second World War brought new interna-
tional law and new international institutions designed "to save suc-
ceeding generations from the scourge of war."' To that end, the U.N.
Charter prohibited the use or threat of force between states and estab-
lished international institutions to maintain international peace and
security.
At birth, the law of the Charter and the U.N. institutions were
universally supported and unanimously acclaimed. Within two or three
years, however, the world was riven by "cold war." Inter arma, the
ancients told us, silent leges.2 Forty years of ideological conflict be-
tween nuclear superpowers have tested whether law is silent during
cold war as it is during the clash of arms. Ideological conflict between
superpowers frustrated the post-war expectations that the Big Powers
would themselves scrupulously respect the law of the Charter and that
they would cooperate in U.N. institutions to assure that others would
respect that law and maintain international peace and security. The
U.N. institutions for maintaining peace, notably the Security Council,
fell victim to the Cold War early on; however, the substantive law of
the U.N. Charter prohibiting the threat or use of force between states
survived.
Cold war did not silence the law of the Charter. No state insisted
that the U.N. collective security system was an essential condition of
that substantive law, so that the failure of collective security as a result
of the Cold War vitiated that law. The Cold War, however, did tempt
powerful adversaries to push against the restraints of law. The Cold
War also tempted smaller states to test whether tensions between su-
perpowers might afford them impunity from harsh consequences for
flouting those legal restraints.
During the forty years of cold war there were clear violations of
the law of the Charter, though far fewer than is commonly believed.
Violations have not been so frequent or so serious as to destroy the law.
Some violations indeed reaffirmed the law by paying it the homage of
hypocrisy: states falsified facts or distorted the significance of those
facts in order to conceal violations or to confuse and mollify condemna-
tions of violations.
During the Cold War attempts to escape the law of the Charter
sometimes took the form of claims that armed forces had entered the
territory of another state by invitation of its government. The U.S.S.R.
1. U.N. CHARTER, preamble.
2. "In war the laws are silent." Cicero.
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claimed that its forces were invited by the government of Czechoslova-
kia in 1948 and again in 1968, by the government of Hungary in 1956,
and by the government of Afghanistan in 1980. The United States
claimed that its troops entered Grenada in 1983 pursuant to invitation
by the Governor General of the territory. There were echoes of claim of
invitation when the United States declared that its invasion of Panama
in 1989 was approved by the person who had been duly elected Presi-
dent and had been welcomed by the people of Panama.
I do not stop to examine the authenticity of any particular claim
of invitation, or the authority of those who issued the invitation in a
particular case. 3 In principle, however, introducing forces into the terri-
tory of another state pursuant to an authentic invitation by the proper
authorities of that state does not violate the law of the Charter. The
Cold War did not affect that law in that respect. Some might suggest
that claims of invitation as well as rejections of such claims give evi-
dence of the abiding vigor of the law of the Charter.
The Meaning of Article 2(4)
During the Cold War, some sought escape from the restraints of
the law of the Charter by pressing for new interpretations of, and ex-
ceptions to, Article 2(4). That article provides:
All Members shall refrain in their international relations from
the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or po-
litical independence of any state, or in any other manner incon-
sistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.
The meaning of Article 2(4) seems clear, yet, perhaps inevitably,
ambiguities appeared early. For example, it is not obvious from the text
whether Article 2(4) prohibits the threat or use of economic force, such
as the "oil weapon" wielded by Arab states in 1973-74. As regards the
use of armed force, it is arguable whether the provision forbids only the
use of force to seize and annex territory, or whether the Charter pro-
hibits any penetration of another state's territory by force, no matter
for how long or for what purpose. Similarly, it is not clear whether, in
prohibiting the threat or use of force against the political independence
of another state, the Charter forbids only the use of force to impose a
puppet government or otherwise make the government of another state
wholly subservient, or whether, more stringently, the Charter prohibits
3. In fact, the authenticity of the alleged invitations was widely rejected in almost
all the instances cited.
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the use of force to impose the will of one state upon another even in a
single instance with regard to a particular decision.
Those ambiguities have been suggested by writers, but during the
Cold War no government seriously espoused or exploited them. Neither
adversary in the Cold War pressed for narrow interpretation of "terri-
torial integrity" or "political independence." Smaller states also es-
chewed the narrow interpretation. The more restrictive meaning of Ar-
ticle 2(4), 1 conclude, prevailed during the Cold War and prevails
today. It is a violation of the U.N. Charter for a state to penetrate the
territory of another state by force, for any purpose and no matter how
briefly; it is a violation of the Charter for a state to use or to threaten
force to impose its will on another state even temporarily or for a lim-
ited purpose.
Intervention and Counter-Intervention in Internal Wars
The Cold War highlighted uncertainties as to the applicability of
the law of the Charter to internal wars. Before the U.N. Charter, inter-
national law permitted military support by an outside state for an in-
cumbent government to help it maintain or restore governmental au-
thority, but it was unlawful for a state to support either side in internal
hostilities that had acquired the character of civil war. The Charter did
not explicitly address this issue, but a case can be made that Article
2(4) forbids any external intervention in internal hostilities by military
force that might help determine the political future of a country. Some
have suggested that a state ought to be permitted to intervene in a civil
war to counter an intervention by another state that might otherwise
determine the political future of the target country. These questions are
a subject for another lecture.'
Proposed Exceptions to Article 2(4)
Article 2(4) has not remained unscathed. Both sides in the Cold
War avoided narrow interpretation of the prohibitions of Article 2(4),
but both sides sought other escape from that article, notably by claim-
ing, exceptions to its prohibitions or by stretching the explicit exception
recognized by the Charter, the right of self-defense provided by Article
51.
4. See Louis Henkin, Use of Force: Law and U.S. Policy, in RIGHT V. MIGHT,
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE (2d ed., Council on Foreign Relations
1991). That subject is one of several addressed also in LAW AND FORCE IN THE NEW
INTERNATIONAL ORDER (Lori Damrosch and David Scheffer eds., 1991).
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"Humanitarian Intervention"
The years of the Cold War saw states claiming and invoking an
unwritten exception to Article 2(4) that would permit the use of force
against another state for certain "benign purposes." One such excep-
tion would permit force in "humanitarian intervention." In particular,
it was argued, the Charter could not have intended to forbid a state to
send armed forces into the territory of another state to save human
lives. That proposed exception was strongly supported by the dramatic,
successful action of the Government of Israel in 1978 at Entebbe in
Uganda to rescue hostages held there by terrorists with the acquies-
cence (if not the complicity) of the government of Idi Amin. The Is-
raeli exploit may indeed have succeeded in establishing an exception to
Article 2(4): a state may use limited force if necessary to rescue hos-
tages and save their lives.5
The Entebbe principle did not result from the tensions of the Cold
War, though terrorist activities, and responses to such activities, inevi-
tably reflected the Cold War and its consequences in the international
system. However, some states were tempted to extend the principle of
humanitarian intervention to justify not only minimal force to extricate
hostages but also invading a country to topple a repressive government
that had killed people, or to prevent it from threatening lives in the
future. A right to use force to save lives was among the justifications
claimed by the United States for invading and replacing governments
in Grenada in 1983 and in Panama in 1989. In those cases and others,
however, the international system condemned the use of force, implic-
itly rejecting the alleged exception to the law of the Charter. The
United States itself rejected that justification when claimed by others.
For example, the United States was prominent in the decision to refuse
to recognize the new government in Cambodia imposed by neighboring
Vietnam, which justified eliminating the previous Cambodian regime
on the ground that it had been guilty of genocide.
Academics continue to argue the scope of an exception for human-
itarian intervention, but the law at the end of the Cold War, I believe,
continues to reject any justification for humanitarian intervention by a
5. The United States might have invoked this principle to justify its unsuccessful
attempt to extricate its diplomatic hostages from Iran in 1980.
6. Perhaps the states condemning the use of force believed that a desire to save
threatened lives was a pretext and not in fact the reason for the invasion.
In the Nicaragua case, at 1 268, the International Court of Justice said that "the
use of force could not be the appropriate method to insure" respect for human rights.
See infra note 9 and accompanying text.
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state on its own authority (beyond the Entebbe principle). A different
question is the permissibility of collective humanitarian intervention on
the authority of the United Nations or of a regional body such as the
Organization of American States. Humanitarian intervention in Iraq in
the aftermath of the Gulf War was justified as part of the collective
self-defense action against Iraq, discussed below. There may be other
circumstances in which genocide or other gross violations of human
rights pose a threat to international peace and security and may war-
rant action by the Security Council. Humanitarian intervention by mil-
itary force on the recommendation of the General Assembly or a re-
gional organization such as the Organization of American States raises
more difficult issues. But that too is a subject for another lecture.7
Ideological Intervention: Socialism and Democracy
The principal exceptions to Article 2(4) claimed during the Cold
War were manifestations of the Cold War itself. In 1968, the U.S.S.R.
asserted what came to be known as "the Brezhnev doctrine": a socialist
state was entitled to intervene by force in another socialist country to
preserve socialism there. Needless to say, the United States rejected
the Brezhnev doctrine. The rest of the world also rejected it.
Later, over time, the United States began to develop an exception
of its own, sometimes denominated the "Reagan doctrine." According
to that doctrine, the United States - and presumably any state - has
the right to use force to help preserve democracy in a country where it
exists, and even to introduce and maintain democracy where it does not
exist. Some such doctrine was invoked by the United States to justify
its invasion of Grenada in 1983. In 1989 - after the Cold War had
ended - the United States made similar claims to support its invasion
of Panama. The Soviet Union rejected the claim that the United States
had a right to invade either Grenada or Panama. The international sys-
tem condemned both invasions in overwhelming votes in the United
Nations Security Council and in the General Assembly.8 The Organi-
zation of American States adopted no resolution on the United States
invasion of Grenada, but its members generally expressed disapproval.
In 1986, in the Nicaragua case, the International Court of Justice
7. That lecture might address also the possibility of multilateral intervention to
establish, maintain or restore democracy or a particular, legitimate, democratically
elected government.
8. On Grenada, see Henkin in MIGHT V. RIGHT, supra note 4, at 54 n.27, 68
n.29. See generally the articles in 28 AM. J. INT'L L. 131-75 (1984). In regard to
Panama, see sources cited in Henkin, infra note 11, at 312 n.76.
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in effect rejected both the Brezhnev doctrine and the Reagan doctrine.
The Court said that it could not
contemplate the creation of a new rule opening up a right of
intervention by one State against another on the ground that
the latter has opted for some particular ideology or political
system. . . .to hold otherwise would make nonsense of the fun-
damental principle of State sovereignty, on which the whole of
international law rests, and the freedom of choice of the politi-
cal, social, economic and cultural system of a state.9
The Cold War, I conclude, did not establish any exceptions to Article
2(4) that would permit unilateral use of force against another state,
other than the Entebbe principle.
The Exception for Self-Defense: Article 51
The U.N. Charter itself explicitly recognizes one exception to the
prohibitions of Article 2(4). Article 51 provides:
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right
of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs
against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security
Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international
peace and security ...
The Cold War saw repeated efforts to extend that exception.
Article 51 seems clear and unambiguous: A state may use force in
self-defense in response to an armed attack. Early during the Cold War
years, however, some writers argued that by referring to the inherent
"right" of self-defense, Article 51 intended to reaffirm the right of self-
defense as it existed before the U.N. Charter, which permitted use of
force in self-defense even in circumstances that did not include an
armed attack. That Article 51 expressly permits the use of force in self-
defense when an armed attack occurs, they argued, did not limit the
traditional, inherent right of self-defense even when there had been no
armed attack.
Interpretations of permissible self-defense under Article 51 were
not impervious to the tensions of the Cold War. The United States, for
example, rejected the permissive interpretation of Article 51 by its al-
9. See Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.) 1986 I.C.J. 14 (June
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lies at Suez in 1956, in part because the United States feared military
involvement by the U.S.S.R. In its confrontations with the U.S.S.R.,
the United States itself for many years was careful not to diminish the
restraints of the law of the Charter and resisted claiming the right of
self-defense where there had been no armed attack, as in the Cuban
Missile Crisis. Beginning with the Reagan Administration, however,
the United States began to advance expansive interpretations of the
right of self-defense. The Reagan Administration took a broad view of
the meaning of "armed attack" when it justified mining Nicaragua's
waters as an action in collective self-defense with El Salvador because
Nicaragua was supplying arms to rebels in El Salvador. To justify its
bombing of targets in Libya, the Reagan Administration defined armed
attack to include a terrorist act at an establishment frequented by U.S.
soldiers in Germany for which the United States held Libya
responsible.
In Panama - after the Cold War had ended - the Bush *Admin-
istration attacked more fundamentally both the prohibitions of Article
2(4) and the limited exception in Article 51. The Panama invasion was
a particular disappointment to supporters of the rule of law in interna-
tional relations. The end of the Cold War had relaxed the stresses on
the law of the Charter and had raised hopes for a new order based on
respect for international law. Neither the U.S. nor the U.S.S.R., it was
assumed, would be tempted henceforth to flout or distort the law as
they had sometimes done for cold war ends. Yet in 1989, after the Cold
War, the United States invaded Panama. Sending 25,000 troops into
Panama clearly violated that country's territorial integrity. Toppling
the Noriega regime and kidnapping Panama's Head of State consti-
tuted clear violations of Panama's political independence.
The justifications invoked by the United States compounded the
blow to the law of the U.N. Charter.10 The United States asserted a
right to use force when there was no armed attack, seeking to justify
the invasion of Panama as in self-defense against harassment of U.S.
nationals and against drug smuggling into the United States. The
United States could be understood as justifying the use of force even if
it was not in self-defense, so long as there was "just cause." The United
States seemed to justify use of force if "the people" later welcomed the
invasion.1
10. I have discussed the unfortunate consequences of extravagant justifications in
my Panama article, cited infra note 11, at 314. See also note 81 of that source, quoting
the concurring opinion of Justice Jackson in Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214,
244-48 (1944).
11. See Abraham D. Sofaer, The Legality of the United States Actions in Pan-
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In Panama, the end of the Cold War may have led not to a reaffir-
mation but to a subversion of the law of the Charter. Fortunately for
the rule of law, the invasion of Panama, and by implication the justifi-
cations claimed for that invasion, were overwhelmingly rejected by gov-
ernments and by international lawyers. The expansive view of permissi-
ble self-defense promoted by the United States during the past decade
had been rejected by the International Court of Justice in the Nicara-
gua case.12 The Court expressly stated that the right of self-defense is
available only when there has been an armed attack.13 The Court also
espoused a strict view of what constitutes an armed attack."
Governments and international lawyers generally have accepted
the principles enunciated by the International Court of Justice. It is
fair to say that an impartial, authoritative judgment as to the state of
international law today - after the Cold War - would reaffirm the
strict view of Article 51: a state may use force in self-defense only in
response to an armed attack, strictly construed.
The Law of the Charter and the Gulf War
Fortunately for the rule of international law, the strict view of the
law of the Charter, including a strict view of the law as to self-defense,
was reaffirmed in the Persian Gulf crisis in 1990. In that case, Iraq's
invasion of Kuwait was a clear violation of Article 2(4). Iraq sought to
justify its invasion by emphasizing the need to end feudal government
in Kuwait, though - not surprisingly - Saddam Hussein did not
claim he would bring "democracy." Iraq claimed the right to act in
self-defense, in defense of its vital interests. Iraq claimed its cause was
just, perhaps echoing the claim of the United States which had used
"just cause" as the code name for its invasion of Panama.
The United States led the Security Council and the world commu-
nity in dismissing Iraq's justifications for invading Kuwait. Under-
standably, the United States attempted to distinguish Kuwait from
Panama, though many critics did not see compelling differences be-
tween them. I wish to believe that taking the lead to vindicate the law
of the Charter against its violation by Iraq will help the United States
revert to the original meaning of Articles 2(4) and 51 on which the
United States insisted during the first decades of the Cold War. I hope
ama, 29 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 281 (1991), and my response, The Invasion of
Panama Under International Law: A Gross Violation, id. at 293.
12. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
13. Nicaragua, 1986 I.C.J. at TT 193-95, 210-11, 232.
14. Id. 1 195.
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that leadership in the Gulf War will help the United States disown the
distortions of the law in which it engaged in the case of Panama. I hope
that U.S. pride in its victory in the Gulf will be transmuted into pride
in maintaining the law of the Charter.
Law and the New International Order
The law is clear, after the Cold War as during the Cold War. I
sum it up: A state may use force against another state only in self-
defense against armed attack. Perhaps a state may use minimal force
against the territory of another state if necessary to extricate hostages,
but a state may not, on its own authority, invade another state to re-
place its government even if that government had been guilty of gross
violations of human rights. A state may not use force against another
to preserve, impose or promote any political or economic system, not
even freedom of enterprise, not even democracy.
That is the law; in my view it is also what the law ought to be.
Proponents of a more relaxed law conjure up hard hypothetical cases,
urging, for example, that one state should be free to invade another
country to prevent a holocaust or to depose a genocidal regime. That
argument is seductive but specious. In fact, though writers have argued
otherwise, no state has pressed for an exception to the law of the Char-
ter that would permit invading another country to remedy even the
grossest of human rights violations. In fact, no state has gone to war
against another state for the purpose of ending human rights violations.
In the 1930's neither the European powers nor the United States went
to war against Hitler because of his genocidal policies. In the 1970's no
state went to war against the Pol Pot regime in Cambodia because of
its notorious practice of massive genocide. In 1981, no state did more
than voice disapproval when the Syrian Government reportedly killed
tens of thousands of its citizens at Hama. The fact is that states will
not go to war to prevent or terminate atrocities, but a state that has its
own reasons of perceived national interest for invading its neighbor will
often cite the latter's human rights record as a pretext for its
invasion. 15
Just as the law of the Charter does not, and ought not, permit a
state to use force against another state to remedy human rights viola-
tions, the law does not and ought not permit the use of force against
another state to impose or preserve democracy. The Reagan doctrine
grew out of the Cold War; in fact, its commitment was not to democ-
15. As did the Government of Vietnam to justify its invasion of Cambodia. See
text following note 6.
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racy but. to anti-Communism. During those years, the United States
continued to support repressive, anti-democratic regimes, so long as
they were not Communist. In fact, no country has invaded another to
bring democracy to that state. In fact, in every instance in which the
United States has gone to war - Korea, Vietnam, the Persian Gulf -
it has done so for reasons other than democracy, and no one believes
that the United States invaded Panama to vindicate an election or to
bring "democracy. After the Gulf War the United States did not use its
armed forces or the influence they carried to establish democracy either
in defeated Iraq or in liberated Kuwait.
After the Cold War, any assertion by the United States that it is
using force to preserve, restore or impose democracy will be seen as a
design for Pax Americana. Even if the world recognized that U.S. de-
mocracy is healthy and that democracy in some other countries is ab-
sent or deficient, the\world would not agree to law that would permit
the United States to invade another country to bring democracy there.
Even if, more generally, all the world were capable of distinguishing
democratic from non-democratic governments, and were persuaded
that some state might 'be prepared to invade another country to bring
democracy there, the world would not, and ought not, accept law that
would permit such an invasion. The costs of military invasion, for in-
vader and for invaded, are too high, the dangers of abuse too great. In
the age of weapons of mass destruction, in a system of states, the law
governing the unilateral use of force must continue to favor peace and
the independence of states even above democracy. Democracy will have
to be promoted by means other than war.16
After the Cold War, too, there is no reason for loosening the re-
straints of law to permit force in "self-defense" when there has been no
armed attack. To permit force to defend other "vital interests" would
be to permit force anywhere; claims of vital interest have been availa-
ble to every aggressor from Hitler to Saddam Hussein. Law must re-
flect a "categorical imperative": The only norm that states can accept
as a general principle applicable to all states in all circumstances is the
provision set forth in Article 2(4), subject only to the limitations set
forth by Article 51; a state may use force only in self-defense against
an armed attack.
In short, in my view, any new international order after the Cold
War and the Gulf War should be the old order of 1945. It is reasonable
to demand, and to expect, that deviations previously justified by the
16. A different subject is whether the U.N. or the OAS might authorize force to
restore or preserve democracy. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
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Cold War will be abandoned. In particular, there is reason to hope that
the United States will recommit itself to the rule of law, including the
law against war; that the United States will itself scrupulously respect
that law; and that it will insist on adherence to it around the world, as
it did when Iraq invaded Kuwait.
I have been discussing the law of the Charter governing the use of
force by a state on its own authority. A different question - a series of
questions - involve the collective use of force to maintain or restore
international peace and security pursuant to authorization by the U.N.
Security Council. That is the subject of my second lecture.
II. COLLECTIVE SECURITY AFTER THE COLD WAR
In addition to outlawing war and the use of force, the United Na-
tions Charter established institutions with authority to maintain or re-
store international peace and security. The Cold War, I have said, sub-
jected the substantive law of the Charter to strains and stresses, yet
that law has survived and may regain its intended vigor. The institu-
tions designed for maintaining international peace and security, notably
the United Nations Security Council, were never fully developed, and
have not exercised the principal functions intended for them. During
the Cold War, the Security Council sometimes contributed to interna-
tional peace by providing peaceful settlement of disputes and auxiliary
forms of peacekeeping, but the Council provided only modest "collec-
tive security" actions to restore international peace and security after it
was breached. During the Cold War, one must conclude, the Security
Council did not serve as a significant deterrent to aggression or
breaches of the peace. It remains to be seen whether after the Cold
War - and after the Gulf War - the Security Council might come to
play the role intended for it.
The Charter Plan
It is important to recall the original plan of the framers of the
Charter. By Article 24(1) Member states have conferred upon the Se-
curity Council primary responsibility for the maintenance of interna-
tional peace and security and have agreed that the Council is acting on
their behalf when it carries out its duties. Under Article 25 Member
states have also agreed to accept and carry out the decisions of the
Security Council in accordance with the Charter.
The Charter sets forth the authority and the responsibilities of the
Security Council in two chapters. Under Chapter VI the Council has
authority to pursue the pacific settlement of disputes. Our concern is
with Chapter VII, "Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace,
LAW AND WAR
Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression."
The plan of Chapter VII is reasonably clear and its language care-
ful and purposeful. Under Article 39 the Council "shall determine the
existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of
aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measure
shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or
restore international peace and security." By Article 39 the Council
can either recommend or decide on measures to be taken. Security
Council recommendations have important weight but do not impose le-
gal obligations on Member states. In contrast, Security Council deci-
sions as to measures to be taken are generally mandatory and Member
states are legally obligated to implement them.
Article 40 authorizes the Security Council to call for provisional
measures "to prevent an aggravation of the situation." Under Article
41, the Security Council may decide on measures not involving the use
of armed force, including economic sanctions, and may call upon states
to apply such measures. If the Security Council considers that sanc-
tions under Article 41 would be inadequate, or if such sanctions have
proved to be inadequate, Article 42 authorizes the Security Council to
"take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to
maintain or restore international peace and security."
Article 42 does not indicate which air, sea, or land forces the Se-
curity Council may use in its actions. However, Article 43 provides that
all members of the United Nations "undertake to make available to the
Security Council, on its call and in accordance with a special agree-
ment or agreements, armed forces, assistance and facilities, including
rights of passage, necessary for the purpose of maintaining interna-
tional peace and security." Clearly, the framers contemplated that the
Security Council would take actions under Article 42 using forces pro-
vided by states pursuant to Article 43.
Collective Security During the Cold War
Thanks to the Cold War, no Article 43 agreements were con-
cluded and therefore no forces were made available to the Security
Council "on its call." That failure raised the question whether the Se-
curity Council could take action under Article 42 in the absence of
Article 43 agreements. During the Cold War, that question remained
hypothetical since the Security Council could not agree on any military
action against aggression. In one instance, in June 1950 - thanks to
the temporary absence of the Soviet Union from the Security Council
so that it could not exercise its veto - the United States led the Secur-
ity Council in mounting an action in support of South Korea against
1991]
160 MD. JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW & TRADE [Vol. 15
aggression from the north. The Security Council recommended that
states come to the assistance of the Republic of Korea and requested
that states put their forces under a unified command headed by the
United States. The Security Council, I note, recommended military ac-
tion; it did not purport to order states to come to the assistance of Ko-
rea. Whether, in the absence of Article 43 agreements, the Security
Council has legal authority to order states to provide forces to help
defend a victim of aggression is open to serious question. In Korea, the
Security Council did not do so.
There was no military action under the auspices of the Security
Council between 1950, the date of the Korean action, and 1990, the
date of the Gulf War. In the Gulf crisis, the Security Council first
demanded that Iraq withdraw from Kuwait. Then it decided on an em-
bargo and other economic sanctions against Iraq and called upon -
that is, ordered - states to comply with them. Then the Security
Council called upon "those Member states cooperating with the Gov-
ernment of Kuwait" to monitor and secure compliance with the em-
bargo, by force if necessary. Finally, the Security Council authorized
states cooperating with Kuwait "to use all necessary means, including
armed force, to liberate Kuwait" and to restore international peace and
security in the area.
In law and in fact, the action in the Gulf was different from that
in Korea in important respects. Strictly, the military action in the Gulf
appears to have been not a collective security action by the Security
Council under Article 42, but a collective self-defense action pursuant
to Article 51. Acting presumably within its authority under Articles 39
and 42, the Security Council authorized, or confirmed the right of, the
victim of an armed attack and its friends, acting in self-defense under
Article 51, to liberate territory conquered by an aggressor. In the Gulf
- unlike Korea - the Security Council did not even recommend mili-
tary action; the Council merely authorized it. The Council resolution
did not address all U.N. members, but only Kuwait and its allies. The
forces sent to the Gulf were not denominated United Nations forces;
they were the forces of "states cooperating with Kuwait." They had no
U.N. command and used no U.N. flag.
International lawyers have debated the legal character of the ac-
tion against Iraq and the legal significance of the Security Council res-
olution authorizing it. Since Kuwait had been the victim of an armed
attack, Article 51 permitted Kuwait to use necessary force against the
aggressor in self-defense, and permitted any states invited by Kuwait to
do so to act with Kuwait in collective self-defense, "until the Security
Council takes action to restore international peace and security." Dur-
ing the early weeks following invasion and conquest by Iraq, neither
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Kuwait nor other states attempted to use force to liberate Kuwait; in-
stead they sought and obtained Security Council measures, pursuant to
Article 41, "not involving the use of armed force," including an em-
bargo and other economic sanctions.
Lawyers have debated whether the right of Kuwait and its allies to
use force in collective self-defense survived the Security Council's em-
bargo resolutions. In my view that was for the Council to decide. Since
Article 51 authorizes the use of force in self-defense "until the Security
Council takes action to restore international peace and security," and
since Article 24 gives the Council primary responsibility for the main-
tenance of international peace and security, I think the Security Coun-
cil had authority to preclude or postpone military action to liberate Ku-
wait. 17 The question is whether the early resolutions, including those
imposing sanctions, intended that effect. In the end, the resolution au-
thorizing Kuwait and its allies to use force to liberate Kuwait elimi-
nated any limiting effect of the "until" clause in Article 51 and ren-
dered moot whether the earlier resolutions intended to preclude
military action.
Law and Collective Security in the Decades Ahead
Kuwait was liberated and fighting in the Gulf War ended in 1991.
The Security Council adopted, and may adopt in future, additional res-
olutions directed to and against Iraq that may further illuminate the
reaches of Security Council power.
The Gulf War afforded the Security Council its first opportunity
to impose economic sanctions against an aggressor"' and to authorize
Member states to enforce them by military action. The Gulf War also
17. Article 51 authorizes action in self-defense "until the Security Council takes
action to restore international peace and security." I read that to mean "until the Se-
curity Council assumes responsibility." It is arguable that Article 51 permits the use of
force by the victim until the Security Council mounts an "action" under Article 42, or
even until - by such action - the Security Council succeeds in restoring international
peace and security. That issue also became hypothetical when the Security Council
authorized the military action.
The Security Council authorized Kuwait and its allies not only to liberate Kuwait
but also "to restore international peace and security in the area." U.N. SCOR (2936rd
mtg.), U.N. Doc. S/RES/678 (1990). That suggests that the right to use force in self-
defense is not limited to liberating conquered territory but includes the right to prevent
or deter resumption of the aggression. Perhaps it suggests, too, that the Security Coun-
cil saw the use of force it was authorizing as not merely action by the victim in self-
defense but also as action by the Security Council under Articles 39 and 42.
18. The Security Council had previously ordered economic sanctions against
South Africa in 1963 and Rhodesia in 1966.
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provided a precedent for Security Council support for the right of
states to use force in self-defense in response to an armed attack even
after a lapse of time and intervening economic sanctions. Perhaps the
Gulf War will bring no more to the future than those particular prece-
dents. But in a system no longer paralyzed by cold war, the successful
end of the Gulf War may inspire a quest for a new world order that
will include a more effective system of collective security. An obvious
possibility is to revert to the system contemplated in 1945 and to try to
make it effective. But the world of 1991 is not the world of 1945. In
1945 the world consisted of some fifty states, all prepared, however re-
luctantly, to recognize the special status of the Big Powers and to ac-
cord them special authority and responsibility, including permanent
membership on the Security Council with a right of veto. Today, the
world consists of 170 states, many of which resent the Big Powers, and
whose numbers and solidarity have inspired them to claim a voice in
the international political system. During the Cold War, the majority
of these states expressly committed themselves to non-alignment; in
fact, many of them tilted against the United States. With the end of
the Cold War and the assumption by the United States of leadership in
the Security Council, many "Third World" states are likely to be par-
ticularly resistant to anything that might smack of U.S. hegemony.
If the Security Council is to be revitalized it may be necessary to
restructure it. In 1945, the parties to the U.N. Charter accorded per-
manent membership in the Security Council to five members. Only two
of those members could claim "super-status" in recognition of their
dominant military power; the others claimed it in large part as a re-
ward for membership in the alliance that had resisted and defeated
Hitler. Today the Second World War is history and many states - if
they accepted permanent membership in principle - might ask
whether France and the United Kingdom are entitled to permanent
member status more than, say, India, Germany, Japan, Brazil.19 Over
the years, moreover, there has been increasing resentment of the veto.
The permanent members will not agree to give up their veto power; but
might they be induced to accept some limitations on its use, for exam-
ple, that it shall not be used by a permanent member to frustrate Se-
curity Council measures directed against itself when it is charged with
a violation of the Charter?
There are reasons to doubt, too, whether other elements in the
original Charter plan can be revived. Despite the end of the Cold War,
19. The disintegration of the U.S.S.R. may raise other complex issues as to the
composition of the Security Council.
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it is not obvious that the Big Powers are prepared to conclude Article
43 agreements with the Security Council, nor is it clear that other
states are prepared to negotiate such agreements. Article 43 agree-
ments are legally binding undertakings to provide a "standing U.N.
army" on call of the Security Council. Today, in 1992, states may not
be ready to make commitments of such major political, military and
economic importance. Most likely, I guess, a new world order will have
to continue without Article 43 forces. Now it may be necessary to plan
for collective security on the basis of less-than-binding commitments
for less-than-permanent forces, for actions that the Security Council
might recommend rather than command. Perhaps it would be less diffi-
cult to negotiate agreements that would enable the Council to provide
limited forces or weapons to national forces acting in self-defense. Per-
haps it would be somewhat less difficult to negotiate Article 43 agree-
ments on a regional basis, with states providing troops to maintain in-
ternational peace and security in the region under the authority of the
Security Council.
Even these possibilities seem unlikely, and the end of the Cold
War and the lessons of Kuwait will probably suggest only less radical
measures. The responses by the Security Council in Korea and Kuwait,
40 years apart, provide two models for Security Council action. In Ko-
rea, the Security Council mounted a U.N. force of national contingents
provided ad hoc by willing states to defend a victim of aggression and
to restore international peace and security. In future, the Security
Council might. again recommend that Member states provide cont-
ingents to a U.N. force under a U.N. command. Indeed, the Security
Council might also consider waking the dormant Military Staff Com-
mittee established pursuant to Article 43 and have it make plans for
such an eventuality. Activating the Military Staff Committee even in
this limited way might contribute something to deterring aggression.
The Gulf War has provided a second model, for an action not of
collective security but of collective self-defense. As in Kuwait, the Se-
curity Council might again carry out its primary responsibility for in-
ternational peace and security by allowing the victim of aggression and
its allies to take the lead in deciding how to counter that aggression.
The Security Council might monitor such military action to assure that
the states engaged in it respect principles of necessity and
proportionality.
Both the Korean model and the Gulf model depend on forces sup-
plied voluntarily by cooperating states, thus putting the onus on the few
states willing to bear it. Ordinarily, these states would have some par-
ticular interest in peace and security in the circumstances and, perhaps
inevitably, that special interest would tend to obscure the larger, collec-
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tive motives and purposes of the military action. In Kuwait, in fact, the
United States failed to persuade the world that it was acting for the
purpose of restoring international peace and security and erasing ag-
gression, rather than to assure the flow of oil and other U.S. interests in
the Middle East. Perhaps it is not possible to disentangle complex webs
of national interest; perhaps there is no need to try to do so. In any
event, relying on forces contributed ad hoc rather than on permanent
Article 43 forces may be the only realistic option available, and the
essentially voluntary character of "Article 51 forces" may have
advantages.
III. A CONSTITUTIONAL CODA: WAR POWERS
In the Gulf crisis, questions under international law as to the authority
of the United States to use force to liberate Kuwait became entangled
with issues under the U.S. Constitution as to the authority of the Presi-
dent to engage U.S. armed forces in that enterprise without authoriza-
tion by Congress.
The war powers of Congress and the President is a big subject.2"
In brief, except in response to an attack upon the United States, the
President has no authority to go to war without authorization by Con-
gress. Presidents do not like to be reminded of that limitation, but there
is no support for any Presidential War Power in constitutional text, in
"original intent," in history, in principles of democratic government, or
even in good sense. In the Persian Gulf crisis, however, the argument
was made, as it had been made earlier in Korea, that the President had
authority to use force to liberate Kuwait because of U.S. responsibili-
ties under the U.N. Charter. Essentially, the Bush Administration ar-
gued, the Charter is a treaty of the United States and it is the Presi-
dent's duty to take care that treaties, like other laws, be faithfully
executed.21 Thus, Presidential spokesmen reasoned, in the circum-
stances of Kuwait, the Charter gave the President authority to go to
war even if he lacked such authority in the absence of the treaty.
That argument is not persuasive. In general, the President has a
duty to carry out U.S. obligations under a treaty and that duty may
imply authority to do so. Therefore, in the Gulf crisis, if the United
States had a legal obligation deriving from the Charter to use force to
liberate Kuwait, the President's claim to constitutional authority to use
such force would have substantial plausibility. The Charter, however,
20. I draw here on HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION (1972),
and CONSTITUTIONALISM, DEMOCRACY AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS (1990).
21. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
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did not impose any legal obligation on the United States to come to the
aid of Kuwait; Article 51 merely permitted the United States to do so.
Since the United States had no legal obligation to use force, the Presi-
dent had no constitutional authority based on treaty obligations to com-
mit U.S. forces to the enterprise.
Similarly, the United States had no legal obligation to come to the
assistance of Kuwait as a result of any binding Security Council resolu-
tion. The Security Council's resolution authorized - therefore permit-
ted - the United States to use force. The Security Council did not,
and probably could not, order the United States to come to the assis-
tance of Kuwait. Only a mandatory resolution of the Security Council,
legally binding on the United States, might give the President constitu-
tional authority to take care that it be faithfully executed.
CONCLUSION
Now my title, "After the Cold War," means also after the Gulf
War. In that war, victory was quick and less costly to the United States
than we had feared it would be.22 But the United States has not yet
clarified the purpose of its involvement and leadership in the war. We
have been told that victory in the Gulf has ushered in a new world
order, but we have not been told what kind of order it will be, or what
will be new about it, or how the United States hopes to achieve it.
After the Cold War and victory in the Persian Gulf we must ask
ourselves what principles we are prepared to preach, live by, and pro-
mote as the law governing the use of force in international relations.
Skeptics may ask, as George Kennan did 40 years ago, whether there
should be a rule of law governing the use of force between states. 23 In
my opinion, nothing that has happened in the past half century sug-
gests that the world would be more peaceful, more democratic, or more
just if we abandoned the effort to maintain international peace by law
and collective security. Nothing that has happened in the past half cen-
tury persuades me that peace, democracy, or justice would flourish bet-
ter under different law or fundamentally different (and practicable) ar-
rangements for maintaining international peace and security.
Victory in the Gulf War has given the United States new prestige,
opportunity, and responsibility. It is in the interest of the United
States, and of all other states, that the United States commit itself to
22. We have not reflected sufficiently on the costs in death and destruction in
Kuwait and in Iraq.
23. GEORGE F. KENNAN, AMERICAN DIPLOMACY: 1900-1950, at 95-99 (1951).
Compare my response in How NATIoNs BEHAVE 322-39 (2d ed. 1979).
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peace through law as the basis for the new international order. Such a
commitment will require leadership. It will require self-restraint. It will
require that we make clear to ourselves and to others our commitment
to international law. The United States will have to persuade the world
that in Iraq it fought for law rather than for oil only. It will require the
United States to reject the Reagan doctrine, and to live down U.S.
"4victories" in Panama and Grenada and the justifications it claimed for
those actions. The United States has proclaimed a new world order
hospitable to constitutionalism, the rule of law, democracy, and respect
for human rights, but it must make clear that those goals too can be
achieved only through peaceful means.
In its principal, essential commitments, the new world order of the
decades ahead, I hope, will resemble the old world order of the months
following the Second World War. I hope the new world order will
bring a recommitment to the Law of the U.N. Charter as it was in-
tended, as the United States helped to conceive it in 1945 - the law of
Article 2(4), which prohibits the use of force between states subject
only to an exception for self-defense in response to armed attack.
A new world order must also include arrangements for collective
security. Again, the new order might well be the old order of 1945, at
least as a starting point. One cannot assume that what was agreed in
1945 is necessarily appropriate for 1991 in all its detail, but until states
can reach agreement on improvements, the law and institutions of the
Charter as conceived in 1945 appear to provide the best hope today for
saving successive generations from the scourge of war. Even that sys-
tem is expensive - in resources, in lives, and in political sacrifices -
and may require planned improvisation and ad hoc modification to
make it acceptable.
After the Cold War, and after the Gulf War, one may hope also
for an expansion of other law not unrelated to war. The end of the Cold
War, the end of the Gulf War, and what we learned of Iraqi nuclear
plans might strengthen the hands of the Big Powers to enforce a more
stringent nuclear non-proliferation treaty. But nuclear weapons do not
pose the only or even the greatest threat to world peace. One lesson of
the Gulf crisis, surely, is that the proliferation of armaments of any
kind disrupts the international order and threatens international peace
and security. The U.N. collective security system will not be secure so
long as weapons are freely and extravagantly bought and sold beyond
any authentic needs of national security.
After the Cold War and victory in the Persian Gulf, the United
States can pursue a new world order that resembles the old world order
in a new light. That order is one in which nations recommit themselves
to refrain from the use of force; to pursue collective rather than unilat-
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eral action; to join in collective security or in collective self-defense if
collective security fails; to control arms and prevent arms proliferation.
Pursuing these commitments will also serve to promote respect for
human rights, and justice, and decency in international life.

